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DIGITAL GOLD: CYBERSECURITY REGULATIONS 
AND ESTABLISHING THE FREE TRADE OF 
BIG DATA 
VICTORIA CONRAD? 
ABSTRACT 
Data is everywhere. With more than ten billion Internet-
enabled devices worldwide, each day individuals create a flood of 
information that is transferred onto the Internet as big data. Busi-
nesses that have the resources to capture and utilize data can better  
understand their consumers, allowing for reinforcement of cus-
tomer relationship management, improvements to the management 
of operational risk, and enhancement of overall firm performance. 
However, big data’s advantages come with high costs. The cost of 
organization and storage coupled with the fact that no legal principle 
allows for any sort of property rights in big data creates a “digi-
tal divide” between data giants, like Facebook and Google, and 
smaller businesses. What’s more, because each country sets different 
cybersecurity standards, start-up costs and expenses are cutting 
many businesses out of the digital market. This Note will first dis-
cuss the basics of big data and then argue that policymakers need 
to promote the free trade of data as a commodity with independ-
ent property rights. This Note will then discuss the obstacles to th e 
free trade of data regarding privacy rights and the diversity of 
international cybersecurity regulations. Finally, this Note will pro-
pose the need for a multilateral convention on cybersecurity that 
will promote a centralized regulatory approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world runs on oil, or at least it did.1 The United States’ 
development into the great industrial power of the twentieth 
century was built on the exploitation of oil.2 However, “‘black gold’ 
is no longer the world’s most valuable resource—it has been sur-
passed by data.”3 The five most valuable companies in the world, 
“Technologic Giants”—Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, and 
Alphabet (Google)—have commodified data to take over their sec-
tors.4 Yet, these Giants are not the only companies benefitting 
from data usage.5 Across industries, “companies are ramping up 
their attention” to big data.6 “[B]illions of connected devices—
smartphones, cars, tablets, household and industrial products, and 
business process machines—that together have the potential to 
transform how companies deliver innovation, create differentiated 
customer experiences, and optimize global operations.”7 
But as this new frontier opens for businesses, data’s con-
tainment, regulation, and protection are falling behind.8 “With 
more than [ten] billion [I]nternet-enabled devices worldwide … 
[the] increasing surface area leaves us vulnerable to attack.”9 Big 
data may be the next “gold rush,” but it involves many costs, 
benefits, and externalities that have yet to be addressed.10 
                                                                                                                         
1 MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE ROAD TO GLOBAL PROSPERITY 18 (Simon & 
Schuster, 1st ed. 2014). 
2 Petroleum Resources, SUNY SUFFOLK, http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/oil  
.html [https://perma.cc/7JGX-RELG]. 
3 Ramona Pringle, ‘Data is the New Oil’: Your Personal Information is Now the 
World’s Most Valuable Commodity, CBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://  
www.cbc.ca/news/technology/data-is-the-new-oil-1.4259677 [https://perma.cc 
/QEZ2-ZY49]. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. 
6 Paul Brody & Veena Pureswaran, The Next Digital Gold Rush: How the 
Internet of Things Will Create Liquid Transparent Markets , 43 STRATEGY & 
LEADERSHIP 36, 36 (2015). 
7 Id. 
8 Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 583 (2014). 
9 Kate Edgar, Data is the New Global Commodity, MEDIUM (July 29, 2016), 
https://medium.com/global-intersection/data-is-the-new-global-commodity-38 
b8d7e43ebf [https://perma.cc/6P6J-ZEU3]. 
10 Brody & Pureswaran, supra note 6. 
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Part I of this Note will give a background on big data, the 
benefits it offers, as well as the barriers that prevent new com-
panies from accessing large-scale data use. Because big data has 
created such an opportunity for economic advancements, Part II 
of this Note will argue that policymakers need to promote the free 
trade of data as a commodity with independent property rights. 
Part III will discuss the obstacles the free trade of data faces 
regarding privacy rights and international cybersecurity regula-
tions. Finally, Part IV will propose the need for a multilateral 
convention to promote the international data exchange and cre-
ate a more centralized system of cybersecurity. 
I. BACKGROUND 
“Big data is just what it sounds like ... massive amounts 
of information generated and gathered by modern technology.”11 
Big data contains traditional scientific information, such as DNA 
evidence, genome mapping, chemical screening, climate data, and 
population analysis.12 However, new analytical technology has 
transformed data collection, enabling researchers to gather less-
traditional information.13 Each day, individuals “generate an ava-
lanche of [data] each day, in tweets and posts, in web browser 
histories and credit card purchases, in GPS-marked cellphone calls, 
in fitness trackers, and ATM transactions.”14 For the first time, 
scientists have the resources to capture and analyze a person’s 
digital existence.15 
Big data has become synonymous with business intelligence, 
analytics, and data mining.16 With 2.5 quintillion bytes of data 
                                                                                                                         
11 Alvin Powell, Big Data, Massive Potential, HARV. GAZETTE (Oct. 13,  2015),  
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2015/10/big-data-massive-potential/ 
[https://perma.cc/QJ6Q-BVJ6]. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 James Manyika et al., Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Com-
petition and Productivity, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. 1 (2011), https://bigdatawg 
.nist.gov/pdf/MGI_big_data_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FWU-Z5DB]. 
16 M. Moorthy et al., An Analysis for Big Data and its Technologies, 4 INT’L 
J. OF COMPUT. SCI. ENG’G & TECH. 412, 412 (2014). 
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created every day,17 “[b]ig data presents concepts, methods, tech-
nologies, IT architectures and tools available to the exponentially 
increasing volumes of diverse information ... improv[ing] the inven-
tiveness and competitiveness of enterprises.”18 Businesses able 
to harness big data have virtually shifted intelligence strategies 
“from reporting and decision support to prediction and next-move 
decision making.”19 The adoption of big data analytical tools and 
infrastructure includes the use of transaction history, social media, 
mobile devices, and automatic identification technologies to pro-
cess and create a better understanding of the industry and its 
consumers.20 Firms that can incorporate these strategies are able 
to better reinforce customer relationship management, improve 
the management of operational risk, and enhance operational 
efficiency and overall firm performance.21 McKinsey Global Insti-
tute estimates that a retailer embracing big data can potentially 
increase its operating margin by more than sixty percent.22 Fur-
thermore, McKinsey estimates the potential annual consumer 
surplus from using services enabled by personal-location data can 
allow consumers to capture $600 billion in economic surplus.23 
Data is now everywhere—in every sector, in every economy, 
in every organization and user of data—the public sector included.24 
Many believe that the use of big data in healthcare allows for per-
sonalization and the collection of real-time lifestyle data that tracks 
specific activities within specific areas.25 For example, Google 
                                                                                                                         
17 Ralph Jacobson, 2.5 Quintillion Bytes of Data Created Every Day. How Does  
CPG & Retail Manage It?, IBM (Apr. 24, 2013), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/in 
sights-on-business/consumer-products/2-5-quintillion-bytes-of-data-created-every 
-day-how-does-cpg-retail-manage-it/ [https://perma.cc/45X8-83Q4]. 
18 Moorthy et al., supra note 16. 
19 Id. 
20 Samuel Fosso Wamba et al., Big Data Analytics and Firm Performance: 
Effects of Dynamic Capabilities, 70 J. BUS. RES. 356, 356 (2017). 
21 Id. (citing Kiron D., Organization Alignment is the Key to Big Data Suc-
cess, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 54 (2013)). 
22 Manyika et al., supra note 15, at 2. 
23 Id. at vii. 
24 Id. at 2. 
25 David B. Nash, Harnessing the Power of Big Data in Healthcare, 7 AM. 
HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 69, 70 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc 
/articles/PMC4049118/pdf/ahdb-07-069.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z97P-AZMA]. 
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employs an automated method for analyzing influenza-related web 
searches to track epidemics, which currently aids the work of the 
Center for Disease Control.26 McKinsey estimates that, if U.S. 
health care could use big data to drive efficiency and quality, the 
potential value from the use of big data could be more than $300 
billion every year.27 
Although the private and public sectors have recognized 
the value big data can bring to the global economy, full-scale in-
tegration still presents obstacles.28 The relative term “big data” 
describes “a situation where the high volume, velocity, and vari-
ety of data exceed[s] an organization’s [preexisting] storage or 
comput[ing] capacity for accurate and timely decision making.”29 
Researchers appropriately explain that the Internet is “like a data-
driven Niagara Falls, surging with an endless, churning, unstoppa-
ble flood of bits and bytes,” and it only keeps getting larger and 
faster.30 CISCO forecasted that “global Internet traffic in 2021 
will be equivalent to 127 times the volume of the entire global 
Internet in 2005.”31 
Data traffic is also not created in a uniform manner.32 Each 
data source a business receives data from collects the information 
into a different form or type, all of which must be filtered through 
one infrastructure to be of any value.33 “Trying to pinpoint and 
analyze a particular piece of information from the Web is like try-
ing to pick out a specific drop of water as it rushes over the falls.”34 
                                                                                                                         
26 Elliot Naidus & Leo Anthony Celi, Big Data in Healthcare: Are We Close 
to It?, 28 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE TERAPIA INTENSIVA 8, 9 (2016), https://www 
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4828085/pdf/rbti-28-01-0008.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2HPE-MYNB]. 
27 Manyika et al., supra note 15, at 2. 
28 Moorthy et al., supra note 16. 
29 Id. 
30 David Hunt, Big Data Challenges: Volume, Variety, Velocity & Veracity , 
N.C. ST. U. RESULTS, 1, 2 (2014), https://research.ncsu.edu/results/2014/12/big 
-data-challenges-volume-variety-velocity-veracity/ [https://perma.cc/62H2-CXBG]. 
31 CISCO Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology 2016–2021, 
CISCO (2017), https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider 
/visual-networking-index-vni/complete-white-paper-c11-481360.html [https:// 
perma.cc/R7GC-UCQA]. 
32 See Hunt, supra note 30. 
33 Id. at 3. 
34 Id. at 2. 
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The technology requirements to gather, organize, and store 
vast amounts of data is just not available for businesses wishing 
to utilize big data.35 “The reality is that traditional database ap-
proaches do not scale or write data fast enough to keep up with 
the speed of creation.”36 Additionally, data warehouses are effec-
tive at organizing data, but a high cost exists for the hardware 
to scale out as the volume grows.37 It seems, in the case of big 
data, quantity does have its own quality.38 
In the private sector, the abundance of data created a “digital 
divide” between the Technologic Giants and smaller companies.39 
The Giants maintain colossal infrastructures able to collect and 
organize data in massive quantities.40 The information collected 
then allows the companies access to better information to improve 
their products, which then attracts more users and generates even 
more data.41 The data divide has a monopolistic effect on each 
company’s market.42 For example, “Amazon now captures 46 [per-
cent] of online shopping” in America,43 while Google and Facebook 
“accounted for about 99 [percent] of the $2.9 billion” growth in 
digital advertising in 2016.44 
Furthermore, the Technologic Giants’ monopoly on data lit-
erally protects themselves.45 Within the tech industry, competition 
                                                                                                                         
35 John Bantleman, The Big Cost of Big Data, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:21 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/04/16/the-big-cost-of-big-data 
/#2728e8195a3b [https://perma.cc/JAY7-ZT7M]. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, ECONOMIST 
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy 
-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource [https:// 
perma.cc/HB4P-AXFG]. 
39 Hwa-Jong Kim et al., The Open Data Interface (ODI) Framework for Public 
Utilization of Big Data, in DATA ANALYTICS 2012 94 (Sandjai Bhulai et al. eds., 
2012) [https://perma.cc/Q8TC-UFLX]. 
40 The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, supra note 38. 
41 Kim et al., supra note 39; The world’s most valuable resource is no longer 
oil, but data, supra note 38. 
42 Kim et al., supra note 39. 
43 Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 712 (2017). 
44 Matthew Ingram, How Google and Facebook Have Taken Over the Digital 
Ad Industry, FORTUNE (Jan. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/04/google-face 
book-ad-industry/ [https://perma.cc/73ZW-LESM]. 
45 The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, supra note 38. 
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arises when incumbents are blindsided by an innovative startup 
or a technological shift.46 However, the monopoly on data within 
the market allows for surveillance systems to span the entire 
economy.47 The Giants can see when a new competitor enters the 
market, allowing them to copy it or acquire it through a “shoot-
out acquisition” before the competitor becomes a threat.48 By creat-
ing early warning systems and further enhancing the digital divide, 
the Technologic Giants can stifle competition.49 
Firms wanting to access big data also face obstacles from 
the decentralized nature of cybersecurity laws.50 “[D]ivergent regu-
latory approaches ... result in uneven levels of protection be-
tween jurisdictions.”51 Cross-border flows of data are then subjected 
to more legal control to prevent laws of more protective regimes 
from being circumvented and the privacy rights of companies 
eroded.52 The World Trade Organization (WTO) acknowledges 
the important aspects of data defense and privacy protection.53 
Article XIV of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) permits trade restrictions that are necessary for “the pro-
tection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing 
and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confi-
dentiality of individual records and accounts.”54 
If regulations on data go too far, these restrictions can hinder 
competition and innovation in the digital market.55 Diversity in 
regulation requires firms to adjust their infrastructure to meet 
each nation’s policies.56 But without any harmonization of laws 
and regimes, the friction between international data exchanges 
can severely limit a business’s ability to enter certain markets.57 
                                                                                                                         
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Data Protection Regulations 
and International Data Flows: Implications for Trade and Development, 2 UNCTD 
/WEB/DTL/STICT/2016/1/iPub (2016). 
51 Id. 
52 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 50. 
53 General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(c)(ii), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183 (1994). 
54 Id. 
55 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 50, at 3. 
56 See id. at 50. 
57 Id. at 3. 
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II. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE FREE TRADE OF DATA 
To maximize the economic and social benefits big data of-
fers, policymakers must recognize organized data as a good and 
apply free trade policies to the digital exchange.58 However, within 
the United States, underdeveloped intellectual property rights and 
privacy issues have caused policymakers at both the federal and 
state levels to hesitate in classifying big data as a commodity.59 
A. Current U.S. Federal and State Law Cannot Establish  
Property Rights 
Data is a raw material of production.60 “Big data is some 
of the most granulated data ever available, generated from mo-
ment to moment from every device ... connected to the [I]nternet.”61 
The challenge for businesses is not gathering the data, but or-
ganizing the data and using it to target consumers in a personal-
ized way.62 Businesses need analytical software to convert the 
large and intricate data sets into utilizable information.63 Busi-
nesses use analytic software to build models based on available 
data and then run situations, repeating the value of data points 
and monitoring how different situations impact results.64 “Cur-
rent computing power can run millions of these simulations, 
thereby iterating all the possible variables until it finds a pat-
tern, correlation, or insight” on proper business strategy.65 
Even though a business’s complex analytical infrastructure  
creates value out of raw data, the federal intellectual property 
                                                                                                                         
58 The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, supra note 38. 
59 Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1125, 1170 (2000). 
60 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Con-
trol in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 240, 240 (2013). 
61 Shelly Blake-Plock, Where’s The Value In Big Data?, FORBES (Apr. 14, 
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/04/14/wheres 
-the-value-in-big-data/#19b054ec30da [https://perma.cc/A74V-DXRQ]. 
62 Id. 
63 See Kim et al., supra note 39, at 96. 
64 Fred Greguras, Legal Issues in Big Data: 2017, ROYSE LAW FIRM (July 3, 
2017, 8:06 PM), http://rroyselaw.com/technology-transactions/agtech/legal-issues 
-big-data-2017/ [https://perma.cc/MJ5H-UFAK]. 
65 Id. 
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system is not well-equipped to deal with ownership of big data or 
the subsequent infrastructures created.66 Data and infrastructures 
are not creative expressions that qualify for copyright (i.e., books, 
paintings, sculptures).67 Not only is current copyright law inefficient 
for big data ownership, but also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) codified an ex-
press limitation on copyright protection of ideas and facts.68 Since 
big data is fundamentally factual information and data infra-
structures usually involve combining algorithms that are classified 
as ideas, this limitation bars copyrighting big data.69 
When considering federal patent law, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International effectively eli-
minated the patentability of analytical software.70 The Court in 
Alice held that, to be patent eligible, computer innovations must 
incorporate “an inventive concept” beyond computer application 
of an abstract idea.71 Since businesses frequently rely on computer 
execution of series of routine algorithms to process big data, the 
use of a computer in a “particular technological environment” was 
not enough to transform an algorithm into an innovative concept.72 
Moreover, patentability of data and the technological infrastruc-
tures would be difficult to formally define to the Patent and 
Trademark Office, since both are subject to constant change and 
innovation.73 When a company gathers new data, the infrastruc-
ture creates new results and the product itself changes, making 
the patent invalid.74 
Turning to state law, scholars have argued that trade secrecy 
law may allow companies to maintain property rights in big data.75 
                                                                                                                         
66 BRADEN R. ALLENBY ET AL., INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 6 
(2001) (ebook). 
67 Id. 
68 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
69 Mattioli, supra note 8, at 553–54. 
70 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
71 Id. (quoting that courts “must distinguish between patents that claim 
the building blocks of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building 
blocks into something more, ... thereby transforming them into a patent-
eligible invention”). 
72 134 S. Ct at 2358; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
73 Mattioli, supra note 8, at 554. 
74 Id. at 554–55, 561. 
75 Id. at 551–53. 
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“The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which most states have 
adopted, defines trade secrets as [‘]information[’] that is (i) valu-
able, and (ii) reasonably protected.”76 “Vendors of information-
based products have long secured exclusivity in their processes 
and knowhow through the law of trade secrets.”77 “The definition 
of [‘]information[’] under the UTSA is expansive, covering technical 
and non-technical information, including methods, knowhow, and 
even ideas.”78 For example, Google’s well-known “PageRank” algo-
rithm and the algorithms high-speed electronic trading firms are 
two examples of data analytics software that have been recognized 
trade secrets.79 
However, the secrecy requirement is difficult to meet for data 
and infrastructures that are shared and marketed, which is a large 
part of the digital trade.80 Google and Facebook, in particular, have 
used personal data as a new source of economic value.81 Once 
processed and classified, they provide relevant information for 
companies about consumer’s interests and activities, which allows 
those companies to retarget these individuals for advertisement 
purposes.82 Retargeted advertising is Google and Facebook’s core 
business.83 Both companies constantly track information about 
their users only to then disclose this data to companies willing 
to pay a per-advertisement rate.84 
If the goal is to expand the free trade of big data domesti-
cally and internationally, creating property rights based on trade 
                                                                                                                         
76 Id. at 550. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (citing Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property 
Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 69, 76 (1999) (“Trade secret law ... extends to technical and non-technical 
information, expression, ideas, and facts, embracing such things as customer and 
supplier lists, financial information, methods of doing business, future marketing,  
sales and product plans and even employee names, job responsibilities and 
phone numbers.”)). 
79 See VAN LINDBERG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OPEN SOURCE: A PRAC-
TICAL GUIDE TO PROTECTING CODE 130–31 (Andy Oram, ed., 2008) (discussing 
Google’s use of trade secrecy). 
80 Mattioli, supra note 8, at 583. 
81 Asunción Esteve, The Business of Personal Data: Google, Facebook, and 
Privacy Issues in the EU and the USA, 7 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 36, 36 (2017). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 40. 
84 Id. 
306 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 10:295 
secret law would be counterintuitive.85 “[T]rade secret law would 
slow the pace of ... innovation” in the data industry and limit trade 
in the digital market.86 Any business that decided to enter the 
digital market would forfeit the property rights it had within the 
data the business collected and organized.87 While the Techno-
logic Giants, with their constant influx of data, have maximized 
their profits without private ownership of data, new companies 
would be pushed out once their property rights were quashed.88 
Since neither federal nor state intellectual property law pro-
vides a legal method to establish property rights in data, policy-
makers and companies have sought to create a sui generis statu-
tory regime of legal protection for organized data.89 By creating 
a statutory regime that recognizes big data as a legal good, poli-
cymakers could finally address the privacy issues of big data as 
well as apply free trade principles to the digital market.90 
B. A Statutory Regime Recognizing Data as a Commodity Would 
Allow Policymakers to Address Privacy Issues as well as Apply 
Free Trade Policies 
Privacy of personal data is an important issue that underpins 
trust in the digital trade.91 The data overflow presents concerns 
for privacy rights that, when left unaddressed, dampen the data 
economy and innovation.92 A statutory regime would offer poli-
cymakers the chance to find “a balance between the beneficial 
uses of data and individual privacy,” as well as apply free trade 
principles to the digital market.93 
Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky discuss privacy concerns 
in the digital age in the article Big Data for All: Privacy and User 
Control in the Age of Analytics.94 Tene and Polonetsky assert that 
                                                                                                                         
85 See Mattioli, supra note 8, at 551. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 538. 
88 See Kim et al., supra note 39, at 94 (discussing how the Technologic Gi-
ants maintain their monopoly on data through the digital divide). 
89 See Mattioli, supra note 8, at 580. 
90 See id. at 583. 
91 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 60, at 239. 
92 Id. 
93 See id.; see also Mattioli, supra note 8, at 583. 
94 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 60, at 239, 251. 
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“the accumulation of personal data has an incremental adverse 
effects [sic] on privacy”95 Researchers can draw different conclu-
sions from an individual’s online activity, and once data is linked 
to an identified individual, it becomes difficult to disentangle.96 
“Once any piece of data has been linked to a person’s real identity 
any association between this data and a virtual identity breaks an-
onymity of the latter.”97 Tene and Polonetsky warn that “this in-
cremental effect will lead to a ‘database of ruin,’ chewing away at an 
individual’s privacy until his or her profile is completely exposed.”98 
Tene and Polonetsky concede that opening up an individ-
ual’s virtual profile gives businesses predictive analysis that can 
be beneficial in numerous areas of society including healthcare, 
law enforcement, and national security.99 However, “[p]redictive 
analysis is particularly problematic when based on sensitive cate-
gories ... such as ... race, [gender] or sexuality.”100 “This type of 
activity, while clearly unconstitutional under existing U.S. law, 
is not so far-fetched in other parts of the world.”101 
A statutory scheme that regulates data as a commodity ex-
changed between not only business-to-business but also consumer-
to-business could allow the digital market to expand while also 
addressing privacy issues.102 Tene and Polonetsky claim that open 
access between individuals and businesses offers a solution to 
privacy issues as the big data market expands.103 The three compo-
nents come together to promote transparency between individual 
users and the companies that want their data.104 The call for 
                                                                                                                         
95 Id. at 251. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (quoting Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymiza-
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transparency is not new, but Tene and Polonetsky emphasize 
individuals’ access to data in a usable format, which can create 
value to individuals and ensure better protection of privacy 
rights.105 A statutory framework formally recognizing a transac-
tion between individuals and businesses where an individual’s 
personal data is exchanged for goods and services could address 
privacy issues, promote transparency, and still allow the digital 
market to expand under free trade.106 
This Note emphasizes, however, that a statutory framework 
should still limit property rights in raw data. Raw data “should 
be regarded as neither an exclusive asset of individuals ... nor 
exclusively the property of businesses.”107 As discussed previously, 
data is a raw material of production.108 Businesses create value 
in big data once the analytical infrastructure compiles, organizes, 
and stores the data.109 Establishing property rights in raw data 
could eviscerate the competitive advantage companies gain when 
investing significant resources to organize and share data in 
commercially valuable ways, thereby stifling innovation within 
the digital market.110 Recognizing the rights of individuals to 
access their data balances their right to privacy, invites scrutiny 
into businesses’ data practices, and exposes potential misuses in 
data prior to a business ever establishing property rights within 
the data in which they invest.111 
 
III. CHALLENGES TO THE FREE TRADE OF DATA: CYBERSECURITY 
THREATS AND REGULATIONS 
The conventional idea is that private and public data in-
frastructures are susceptible to catastrophic cyberattacks that could 
leave consumers, enterprises and governments vulnerable.112 As 
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an increasing portion of the world embraces the digital era, cyberat-
tacks “can now affect critical infrastructure, turn smartphones 
into monitoring devices, and put the safety of healthcare patients 
at risk.”113 To protect consumer data and private infrastructures, 
over fifty governments worldwide have developed cybersecurity 
strategies and regulations.114 These government policies range 
from strong government control over both domestic and interna-
tional flows of data to and from their borders, to voluntary regu-
lations that promote coordination between the government and 
private companies.115 This Section will first give a brief history 
of cyber threats and then discuss how cybersecurity regulations 
in the United States, the European Union and China have ad-
vanced to address future cyberattacks. 
A. The History of Cybersecurity Threats 
Breaches of data and information have existed as long as 
companies have stored digital information.116 Public awareness 
of large-scale data breaches parallels the growth of computer access 
in the 1980s and 1990s.117 As technology grows, governments and 
businesses store more information digitally, increasing efficiency 
but exposing more information to possible cyberattacks.118 Since 
2005, “the advancement of technology and proliferation of elec-
tronic data throughout the world,” has made “data breaches a 
top concern for both enterprises and consumers.”119 
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The first major cybersecurity threat the world faced was 
the emergence of malicious software.120 In 1988, the first Inter-
net worm, the Morris worm, infected ten percent of the Internet.121 
This worm’s “self-replication flooded many networks with an over-
load of traffic ... temporarily [disabling] approximately six thousand 
computers, including machines at NASA, some major universities, 
and several military bases.”122 However, system administrators 
were soon able to detect the worm and run a defense program.123 
Ultimately, the worm was a victim of its own success. The Morris 
worm was poor at determining whether or not a system was 
already infected, targets were soon infected with multiple copies 
of the worm running simultaneously. As copies scanned for 
new targets, the resulting exponential increase in the load on 
individual computers and network connections tipped off system 
administrators.124 
The Morris worm was a landmark event in cybersecurity, 
leading to public awareness of “the potential that such attacks 
held for mass electronic destruction.”125 
The pace and magnitude of cyberattacks have increased since 
the foundations of cyber breaches in the 1990s.126 Between 2005 
and 2015, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reported more than 
4,500 data breaches, resulting in more than 816 million individual  
records breached.127 “In actuality, the numbers are [probably] 
much higher, as the total number of records breached reported 
by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse includes breach reports for 
which the number of records breached is unknown.”128 “Addi-
tionally, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is not a comprehensive 
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compilation of all breach data, so the actual ... [cumulative harm 
from data breaches] is likely substantially higher.”129  
The prime example of this is the financial and insurance 
data breaches that occurred in recent years.130 For example, in 
2013, the largest bank in the United States, JP Morgan & Chase 
(JP Morgan), reported that private information from seventy-six 
million households and eight million small businesses was exposed 
in a monumental cyberattack.131 JP Morgan, on the other hand, 
“was seen as one of the best at security.”132 Financial institu-
tions store “everything from social security numbers to detailed 
records of past spending.”133 As a result, financial institutions 
invest heavily in their cybersecurity programs.134 JP Morgan 
currently spends $500 million per year on cybersecurity alone to 
protect its data infrastructure and the sensitive information it 
stores.135 Thus, what was most alarming about the JP Morgan 
breach was how prepared the company was and how little dif-
ference it made.136 
The JP Morgan breach indicated that cyberattacks may be 
an unavoidable consequence of collecting and storing this much 
sensitive information:137 “[a]s innovative uses of the Internet by 
business and government organizations increases, so do the number 
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of threats to information system security.”138 Even with current 
technology, many scholars suggest that large-scale information 
collection creates “risk[s] [that] cannot completely be avoided.”139 
When considering future cyberattacks, policymakers and 
scholars warn that attacks will shift from data and information 
theft to cyberterrorism.140 As the digital revolution spreads and 
captures more sectors, technology that is fundamental to society—
such as power grids, water service, or air traffic control—could be at 
risk.141 Cyber threats are always evolving.142 However, as the 
number, severity, and sophistication of attacks progresses so 
does the development of better action to protect businesses and 
individuals.143 
B. Major Cybersecurity Actions in the United States, the European 
Union, and China 
“Cybercrimes are borderless crimes where the repercussions 
and consequences are endless.”144 A cybersecurity regulation in-
volves directives to protect information technology and computer 
systems with the purpose of enforcing safety mandates on compa-
nies and organizations to protect their infrastructure and data from 
cyberattacks.145 As cyberattacks become more and more common, 
countries are beginning to take part in both private and public 
cyber-safety actions.146 Many countries established their own 
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cybersecurity regulations with unique standards and approaches 
to digital safety.147 
1. The United States 
The role of the federal government in cybersecurity in-
volves coordinating with private entities to secure both federal 
and nonfederal systems.148 On December 18, 2015, President 
Obama signed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (the Cyber Act) into 
law.149 The Cyber Act is landmark legislation that established 
the first broad mechanism under which the federal government, 
specifically the Department of Homeland Security, can begin 
standardizing cybersecurity.150 
The Act ... establishes a mechanism for cybersecurity information 
sharing among the private-sector and federal government en-
tities. It also provides safe harbors from liability for private enti-
ties that share cybersecurity information in accordance with 
certain procedures, and it authorizes various entities, includ-
ing [many] outside the federal government, to monitor certain 
information systems and operate defense measures for cyber-
security purposes. The Act also contains provisions designed 
to bolster cybersecurity protections at federal agencies, assess 
the federal government’s cybersecurity workforce, and implement  
a range of measures intended to improve the cybersecurity 
preparedness of critical information systems and networks.151  
The Cyber Act also requires that nonfederal entities re-
view information that will be shared or utilized by those entities 
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to remove any information that the entities “know[] at the time 
of sharing” to be personally identified information not directly 
related to cybersecurity.152 
Instead of a hardline regulatory approach, President Obama 
claimed the “only ... way to defend America from these cyber 
threats ... is through government and industry working together, 
sharing appropriate information as true partners.”153 The frame-
work is designed to help businesses decide how to create new 
cybersecurity systems and implement new cybersecurity tech-
niques as compared with prominent techniques used within the 
same industry.154 
In May 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 
13800, entitled “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Net-
works and Critical Infrastructure,” which largely builds off the 
Obama Administration’s cybersecurity policies.155 The executive 
order draws directly on the Cyber Act’s policy aim of producing a 
plan “to address the risk of multiple simultaneous cyber incidents 
affecting critical infrastructure,”156 and applying standards for 
risk management set in the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology’s framework for protecting critical infrastructures.157 
Trump’s executive order made key additions to U.S. cy-
bersecurity policy, including directly assigning accountability to 
the heads of executive departments and agencies “for managing 
cybersecurity risk to their enterprises.”158 However, the execu-
tive order also reasserts that “because risk management decisions 
made by agency heads can affect the risk to the executive branch 
as a whole, ... cybersecurity risks [constitute] ... an executive branch 
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enterprise,” and will be addressed through the full power of the 
executive, not merely the federal agencies.159 Another key element 
of the executive order is the “market transparency” provision.160 
This provision aims to “promote appropriate market transparency 
of cybersecurity risk management practices by critical infrastruc-
ture entities” in both the public and private sectors.161 
Trump’s executive order is far from a comprehensive 
regulation—“[t]he final order goes ... much [more] ... [in-]depth 
on policy goals” as opposed to addressing how to actually meet 
them.162 The only true action the executive order implements in 
the present is evaluating federal agencies’ current cybersecurity 
practices and requiring the initial steps to coordinate policies 
between the Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Justice, and Department of Commerce.163 The current actions being 
taken appear to be merely precursors to eventually creating a 
broader cybersecurity policy.164 But for now, the federal approach 
to cybersecurity is no more than far-reaching policy goals coupled 
with a framework to eventually create a centralized cybersecurity 
regulation in the future.165 
On the state level, at least forty-two states have introduced 
more than 240 cybersecurity-related bills or resolutions.166 Ac-
cording to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the key 
areas of state legislative activity include “[i]mproving government 
security practices ... commissions, task forces[,] and studies [on 
cyber security] ... [f]unding for cybersecurity programs and initi-
atives ... [t]argeting computer crimes ... [r]estricting public dis-
closure of sensitive security information [and] ... [p]romoting 
workforce, training, [and] economic development.”167 
                                                                                                                         
159 Id. 
160 Id. § 2(c). 
161 Id. 
162 But see Sean Gallagher, Something about Trump cybersecurity execu-
tive order seems awfully familiar, ARS TECHNICA (May 18, 2017), https://ars 
technica.com/tech-policy/2017/05/the-text-and-subtext-of-trumps-cyber-execu 
tive-order/ [https://perma.cc/LV8J-ZBR8]. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 Cybersecurity Legislation 2017, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Dec. 29, 
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-tech 
nology/cybersecurity-legislation-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/82R6-4TWU]. 
167 Id. 
316 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 10:295 
While some of these actions have been performed at the 
federal level, “[s]tate regulation of cybersecurity [generally] stand[s] 
apart from federal standards.”168 First, state laws are able to focus 
more on consumer protection as opposed to the defense of large-
scale infrastructure.169 Second, state statutes often include a 
reasonableness standard for the data security efforts of entities 
that manage personal information.170 In 2002, Minnesota enacted 
a cybersecurity statute requiring internet service providers to take 
“reasonable steps to maintain the security and privacy of a con-
sumer’s personally identifiable information.”171 Since then “thirteen 
other states have issued broader data security mandates gener-
ally requiring any entity ... that manages ‘personal information’ 
to employ reasonable data security practices.”172 
Although these commonalities may suggest that there is a 
harmonized approach to cybersecurity across US states, this is far  
from the case.173 “Each state statute [usually] applies ... [different 
standards of safety] to different categories of data.”174 Moreover, 
the term “reasonable data security” allows for a range of inter-
pretations within different state legislatures and state judicial 
systems.175 This sort of flexibility has caused states to diverge 
from any sort of common regulatory approach.176 For example, the 
California Attorney General released the California Data Breach 
Report in 2016, which referenced specific standards for defining 
“reasonableness,” providing that, “the failure to implement all 
the [Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security] controls that 
apply to an organization’s environmental constitutes a lack of 
reasonable security” under California’s cybersecurity statute.177 
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California’s working definition of “reasonable” data security differs 
significantly from many other states like Minnesota’s that requires 
“reasonable steps to maintain the security and privacy,” which is a 
far more vague and open to a wide variety of interpretations.178 
These diverging standards can impose significant burdens 
on companies, especially small businesses, that actively use and 
store data.179 Based on the variations in each state, businesses 
will have to comply with dozens of different cybersecurity stand-
ards to enter different markets within the United States.180 Ad-
ditionally, businesses must consider the costs of fitting into these 
regulations and the risk of potential legal exposure under each 
state law against the potential profits.181 Without a more unified 
standard, many businesses are kept out of digital markets with-
in different states.182 
2. The European Union 
On April 14, 2016, the EU Parliament approved the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).183 The GDPR was designed to 
“harmonize data privacy laws across Europe, to protect and em-
power all EU citizens data privacy and to reshape the way organi-
zations across the region approach data privacy.”184 Since the 
European Commission first proposed a unified approach to cy-
bersecurity, the legislation has attracted attention from the inter-
national community.185 “[Enterprises] across the EU and beyond 
have been frustrated by the increasing lack of [harmonization] 
across the Member States, despite data flowing increasingly without 
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boundaries.”186 The EU institutions have since risen to the task: the 
adoption of the GDPR was a milestone in data protection law.187 
The GDPR updates the EU’s 1995 Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC.188 Although the key principles of data privacy estab-
lished in the previous directive remain, the GDPR made many 
changes to the regulatory policy.189 The biggest change to the 
regulatory landscape comes with the extended jurisdiction of the 
GDPR, applying “to all companies processing the personal data 
of data subjects residing in the Union, regardless of the company’s 
location.”190 The previous territorial applicability under the di-
rective referred to data process “in context of [the activities] of 
an establishment,” as opposed to the “data subjects.”191 The GDPR 
makes its application very clear: “it will apply to the processing 
of personal data by controllers and processors in the EU, regard-
less of whether the processing takes place in the EU or not.”192 
In addition, the GDPR will also have extraterritorial applicabil-
ity to data controllers or processors that are not even established 
in the EU where the activities relate to: “offering goods or ser-
vices to EU citizens (irrespective of whether payment is required) 
and the monitoring of behavior that takes place within the EU.”193 
Also, to represent their interest in data sharing within member 
states and facilitate smoother compliance, “[n]on-E[U] business-
es processing the data of EU citizens will also have to appoint a 
representative in the EU.”194 
The GDPR also established new penalties for organiza-
tions in breach.195 As a maximum penalty, organizations in breach 
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of the GDPR “can be fined up to four percent of annual global 
turnover or €20 Million (whichever is greater).”196 There is a “tiered 
approach to fines” under the GDPR based on the seriousness of 
the infringement.197 Additionally, based on the GDPR’s extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, rules apply to all controllers and processors 
that deal in EU citizens personal data, meaning cloud storage and 
processing will no longer be exempt from the EU’s regulatory 
enforcement and penalties.198 
Finally, the GDPR expanded “data subject” rights, which 
provides individuals a wide array of rights that can be enforced 
against any organizations processing personal data.199 At its core, 
data subject rights enforce the GDPR’s “privacy by design” con-
cept.200 Privacy by design calls for “the inclusion of data protec-
tion from the onset of the designing of systems, rather than an 
addition.”201 More specifically, Article 28 states “[t]he controller 
shall ... implement appropriate technical and organizational mea-
sures ... in an effective way ... in order to meet the requirements 
of this Regulation.”202 Furthermore, Article 23 calls for controllers to 
process only the data “absolutely necessary for the completion of 
its duties,” and limits access to personal data to only those 
“need[ed] to act out the processing.”203 The fundamental data 
subject rights the GDPR added to EU data protection law in-
clude: the right to access, the right to be forgotten, and the right 
to restrict processing.204 
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The right to access is a feature necessary to ensure data 
subjects are able to enforce their data protection rights under the 
GDPR.205 “The GDPR expand[ed] the mandatory categories of 
information which must be supplied in connection with data sub-
ject access request[s].”206 Under Article 15, data subjects have 
the right to obtain a copy of the personal data the controller pro-
cesses as well as general information about where the controller 
is processing their data, the purpose of processing, the category 
of data being processed, and the recipients who will have access 
to the data.207 
The right to be forgotten, or “Data Erasure,” entitles the 
data subject to require the controller to delete the subject’s data, 
terminate additional distribution, and potentially have third parties 
cease processing his or her personal data.208 However, data sub-
jects must meet one of the reasons for erasure as outlined in 
Article 17, which include but are not limited to: (1) that the data 
is no longer needed for its lawful, original purpose, (2) that the 
lawful basis for the processing is the data subject’s consent which 
may be withdrawn, or (3) erasure is necessary to comply with 
EU law or national law of the Member State.209 
Finally, a new concept in the GDPR is the right to restrict 
processing.210 “In some circumstances, data subjects may not be 
entitled to require the controller to erase their personal data but 
may be entitled to limit the purposes for which the controller 
can process [that] data.”211 Nevertheless, this right is usually 
coupled with the right to erasure as a temporary means to pro-
tect the data subject until the governing body can make a formal 
decision on an erasure request.212 Data subjects have the right 
to restrict the processing of personal data if: (1) the accuracy of 
the data is contested,213 (2) the processing is unlawful and the 
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data subject requests restriction as opposed to erasure, (3) the 
controller no longer needs the data for the original purpose but the 
data is still necessary for the controller to establish or defend a 
legal right, or (4) verification of overriding grounds is pending 
during the context of an erasure.214 
Overall, the GDPR’s expansion of data subject rights has 
created new burdens for firms and businesses accessing and pro-
cessing EU data.215 Organizations now face a much broader range 
of circumstances in which data subjects can trigger administra-
tive burdens and outright loss of access to consumer information.216 
The GDPR’s focus on transparency and accountability puts 
individuals and their rights at the heart of the GDPR. Control-
lers will need to consider all aspects of their processing activities  
in light of the rights afforded to individuals, so that they will 
ultimately be in a position to demonstrate compliance not only 
when individuals seek to exercise those rights, but with their 
overall obligations under the GDPR.217 
3. China 
The Chinese Cybersecurity Law (CSL) came into effect on 
June 1, 2017, becoming the first comprehensive law to address 
cybersecurity concerns in China.218 The law imposes new security 
standards for both cyber and physical aspects of networks includ-
ing strict data localization regulations, increased government access 
to cyber activities, and monetary penalties for non-compliance.219 
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China’s move to strengthen its cybersecurity regulations is not 
dissimilar to the global shift in favor of tighter cybersecurity.220 
“China is a vocal proponent of ‘cyberspace sovereignty,’ a theory 
that [advocates the right for the] state[] ... to [exclusively] regulate 
the internet activity within their border[].”221 However, the appli-
cation of CSL has been surrounded by controversy, particularly 
from the international business community.222 
The CSL expressly applies to two entities: “Network Op-
erators” and “Critical Information Infrastructure Operators.”223 
Network operators are defined as “owners, operators, and ser-
vice providers of networks.”224 This definition is extremely vague 
and can be broadly interpreted to include any organization that 
operates a computer network or data storage unit in China.225 
Thus, a Chinese or foreign company that collects data and in-
formation by providing services, conducting business activities, 
or even just hosting a website in China is likely subject to CSL 
regulations as a “Network Operator”.226 
Network operators are obligated to “safeguard their net-
works against disruption, damage or unauthorized access, and 
to prevent data leakage, theft or tampering.”227 CSL requires net-
work operators to build an effective and clear security system 
within their organizations and find “rational technical solutions” 
to improving data protection and mitigating network risks.228 
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Network operators will also be subject to specific rules depending 
on their classification under the Multi-level Network Security 
Protection Scheme.229 The Multi-level Network Security Protec-
tion Scheme is an existing regulation that requires companies to 
meet certain security standards based on an evaluation of the 
information companies are gathering and the potential threat to 
national security a breach would create.230 
“Critical Information Infrastructure Operators” are a sub-
set of “Network Operators” that “are subject to notably stricter 
requirements.”231 While this is a key distinction under the regu-
lation, the CSL does not clearly define a “Critical Information 
Infrastructure Operator.”232 Article 31 provides a non-exhaustive 
list of industrial sectors that are considered “critical information 
infrastructure,”233 with a catchall provision that includes “infra-
structure that, in the event of damage, loss of function, or data 
leak, might seriously endanger national security, national wel-
fare or the livelihoods of the people, or the public interest.”234 
This broad definition means that any company that is a supplier 
to a critical sector, as well as any company that holds a signifi-
cant amount of information on Chinese citizens, could become a 
target for regulations under the CSL.235 
Organizations that are classified critical information in-
frastructure operators must regularly assess their cyber risk in 
accordance with Article 38 of the CSL.236 The largest change in 
the CSL is that all personal information and important data 
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that critical information infrastructure operators collect in China 
must be stored domestically.237 If an organization needs to trans-
mit data offshore, a designated government agency must conduct a 
security assessment and the transferred data must be adjusted 
to best fit the CSL requirements.238 Thus, organizations that 
operate critical information infrastructures in China and trans-
mit data to headquarters, partners, or suppliers overseas will 
need to reassess and reorganize their approach to data collection 
and storage.239 
Finally, the CSL added specific penalties for foreign offend-
ers.240 “In addition to the usual penalties for non-compliance241 ... 
the new Law provides for specific penalties such as the freezing of 
assets or other sanctions” to any foreign organization or individ-
uals that attack or harm any critical information infrastructures 
in China.242 
Companies operating in China or seeking access to Chinese 
markets, must evaluate how the new laws may impact opera-
tions.243 While the CSL does seek to balance the dual goals of 
enhancing cybersecurity and developing the digital economy 
through the free flow of data,244 overseas opposition groups lob-
bied hard to delay the CSL implementation.245 Industry groups 
claim that the influx of new measures gives the Chinese govern-
ment “unprecedented access to foreign companies’ technology” 
and the information they collect through the movement of data.246 
Furthermore, more than fifty trade associations and chambers of 
commerce signed a letter in May 2017 in an effort to delay the 
CSL’s implementation, arguing “the law could affect billions of 
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dollars of cross-border trade and lock out foreign cloud operators 
because of limits on how they operate in the country.”247 Moreover, 
according to the letter from bodies representing businesses based 
in the United States, Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia and else-
where, “[t]hese measures will add costly burdens, restrict com-
petition and may decrease the security of products and [jeopardize] 
the privacy of Chinese citizens.”248 
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CYBERSECURITY AND THE 
FREE TRADE OF DATA 
Cyberspace has been notoriously difficult to regulate.249 
Large-scale regulations require coordination between governments 
and many private companies with many different infrastruc-
tures.250 Moreover, policyholders also must consider the balance 
between individual privacy rights and potential business growth, 
making cybersecurity a novel issue.251  
While cybercrimes have obvious effects on economic activ-
ity, cybersecurity can have similar negative economic implica-
tions “if only because of its’ high cost and deliberate information 
inefficiencies due to deliberate isolation of networks.”252 In other 
words, cyberattacks harm the economy, and without a coordinated 
approach to cybersecurity, the digital market is bogged down with  
“information inefficiencies.”253 Likewise, “no nation-state can 
achieve adequate cybersecurity on its own;” cybercrimes do not 
respect geographic or political borders, and without internation-
al coordination, economic ramifications are merely surface is-
sues to the idea of cyberwarfare.254 
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To address the shortcomings of the current, decentralized 
cybersecurity system, an international platform should recog-
nize a convention ensuring a coordinated, multilateral strategy 
to address cybersecurity.255 Also, to balance the overhaul of reg-
ulations that come with an international agreement, the WTO 
should update trade policies to include big data as a formal, reg-
ulated commodity in which free trade efforts must apply to the 
fullest extent possible.256 
A. A Multilateral Convention on an International Platform 
Cybercrimes are transnational and require a transnational 
response.257 The current decentralized measures the private and 
public sectors provide cannot reach the adequate level of security 
necessary to promote the digital trade while also protecting con-
sumers.258 The speed and technical complexity of cyber-activity 
need a “prearranged, agreed procedures for cooperation in inves-
tigating and responding to threats and attacks.”259 
In 1999, members of government, industry, NGOs, and aca-
demia, from many nations, met at Stanford University’s Center 
for International Security and Cooperation to discuss a potential 
plan for an international agreement concerning cybersecurity.260 
The Stanford meeting drafted a multilateral cybersecurity con-
vention, titled the “Proposal for an International Convention on 
Cyber Crime and Terrorism.”261 The Proposal argues that an in-
ternational convention on cybersecurity would ensure that State 
Parties unanimously: 
? “adopt laws making dangerous cyber activities 
criminal; 
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? enforce those laws or extradite criminals for prose-
cution by other States; 
? cooperate in investigating criminal activities and 
in providing usable evidence for prosecutions; and 
? participate in formulating and agree to adopt and 
implement standards and practices that enhance 
safety and security.”262 
An international agency created pursuant to the Convention 
would provide a forum for “international discussion, ongoing 
response to technological developments, and technical assistance 
to developing States.”263 The Proposal suggests that policymakers 
form the international “Agency for Information Infrastructure Pro-
tection” to serve as a “formal structure in which interested groups 
will cooperate through experts in countries around the world in 
developing standards and practices concerning cyber security.”264 
The challenge of controlling cybercrimes requires a full 
range of responses, including both voluntary and legally man-
dated cooperation.265 An international cybersecurity agreement 
will only be possible, however, if policymakers can take into ac-
count the “substantial differences that exist between activities 
regulated by established international regimes and cyber systems” 
while also integrating the new policies to help standardize cyberse-
curity efforts.266 Considerable financial burdens and sovereignty 
issues are byproducts of unifying cybersecurity efforts.267 “Many 
states will be unprepared … to agree to limit their control of cyber 
activities they regard as essential” to the national and economic 
security interests.268 Cooperation between developed and devel-
oping nations is essential to the “development and implementation 
of technological solutions and standards to enhance the capacity 
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of states and users effectively to protect computers and systems 
from future attacks.”269 
“The globally-interconnected digital information and com-
munication infrastructure known as cyberspace underpins almost 
every facet of modern society and provides critical support for 
the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national 
security.”270 Currently, many believe that cybersecurity as a con-
cept involves only national or industry-based security standards 
and consumer privacy laws.271 An international agreement on cy-
bersecurity could focus more on “Internet governance,” which 
involves balancing “human rights and the economic and devel-
opmental interests associated with a vibrant, innovative, and 
competitive [information and communication technology]272 sec-
tor” with state security interests.273 States should consider the 
high potential benefits of an international cybersecurity agreement 
against some administrative and sovereignty burdens.274 
Scholars still debate whether states should address cyber-
security issues through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) or the United Nations (U.N.).275 NATO is arguably the 
most important collective defense and has already addressed cyber 
threats in policy and operational terms.276 In 2002, the NATO Sum-
mit in Prague established the Cyber Defense Program to create a 
unified front to defend against cyberattacks.277 The Cyber Defense 
Program then created the NATO Computer Incident Response 
Capability to further provide NATO with procedures to “prevent, 
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detect, and respond to cyber threats.”278 Despite NATO’s preven-
tative approach, the cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007 revealed 
NATO’s inadequacy in cyber-protection.279 The Estonian incident 
“helped bring the stakes of cyber threats into sharper perspec-
tive for NATO” and sparked a significant restoration in NATO’s 
political commitment and operational capabilities to address cy-
bercrimes.280 NATO has continually given prominence to cyber-
defense strategies through the Strategic Concept adopted at the 
Lisbon summit in 2010, the Cyber Defense Concept, Policy, and 
Action Plan in 2011 and the Chicago summit declaration in 2012.281 
The U.N. has been less forthcoming on international coor-
dination for cybersecurity policies.282 The first major work emerged 
in 2001 with the U.N. Convention on Cybercrime.283 The treaty 
signified the first international treaty  
to define and standardize responses to Internet crimes. It sought  
to bridge the gap between international domestic laws regard-
ing behavior, like copyright infringement, fraud, hate crimes, 
and issues regarding network security. Most of what this con-
vention and treaty aimed at was to act as a facilitating docum ent 
for international cooperation when it comes to preventing, label-
ing, and punishing cyber-crimes.284 
The treaty has been ratified by the EU, Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and several other countries.285 In 2012, the U.N. Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon appointed a governmental panel of experts 
from fifteen states, called the “Group of Governmental Experts on 
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications 
in Context of International Security,” to draft an expert report 
on developments in cybersecurity and information technology.286 
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This report, now seen as a seminal work on the cybersecurity 
actions, “highlights four main areas to be addressed: cooperation, 
international law, confidence-building measures, and improving 
state IT capacities.”287 The most recent report from the Govern-
ment Groups of Experts included four landmark findings in the 
cybersecurity field: 
? “the existence of state sovereignty in cyberspace, 
? international obligations made by states are ap-
plicable in cyberspace, 
? states cannot use proxies to break international 
law and norms, and 
? the recognition of the UN as the principal organ-
ization for the establishment of fundamental 
principles on the topic.”288 
The international platform through which nations estab-
lish a multilateral convention on cybersecurity would likely in-
fluence how the world understands the term “cybersecurity.”289 
NATO is primarily a defensive organization.290 Cybersecurity from 
NATO’s point of view “ha[s] security at its core,” which means 
an appropriate agreement would promote a government’s ability 
to safeguard its national security, at the expense of expanding 
individual and business rights in the digital market.291 Those that 
sponsor a defensive approach to cybersecurity believe an inter-
national cybersecurity treaty should warrant nations the power 
to “know exactly who sent and received every transmission, every 
transmission’s traceroute, and the contents of every transmission ; 
it can delete, block, and/or seize any transmission of which it 
disapproves; and it can punish efficiently those who send or rece ive 
unapproved transmissions.”292 
At the other end of the spectrum, the U.N. is an interna-
tional organization committed to promoting social progress, better 
living standards, and human rights in addition to international 
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peace and security.293 A multilateral convention on cybersecurity 
from the U.N.’s perspective could better incorporate the idea of 
internet governance, which balances internet security with “the 
type of freedoms protected by instruments such as the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution, the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
and numerous United Nations human rights documents.”294 
B. The World Trade Organization and the Free Trade of Data 
Every international transaction entails a data flow across 
borders.295 Whether the exchange falls between business groups 
or between subsidiaries of the same company, “the business net-
work feeds on communications between partners, often scattered 
all over the world.”296 A multilateral convention should centralize 
state cybersecurity actions, but not at the cost of digital trade.297 To 
protect the digital market, the WTO should recognize data as a 
commodity and impose free trade obligations to allow the cross-
border flow of data between international parties.298 
The WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
is a positive agreement between members: “a Member agrees to 
open its markets to services and service providers of other Mem-
bers in only those service sectors listed in the Member’s Schedule of 
Specific Commitments, and as limited by any terms and conditions 
specified in that Schedule.”299 The most significant obligation 
under GATS Article II requires “a Member to extend uncondi-
tionally, to services and services suppliers of any other Member, 
‘treatment no less favorable’ than that it accords to like services 
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and service suppliers of any other Member.”300 The “most favored 
nation[s]” clause requires open markets for all member nations.301 
However, GATS Article XIV provides a list of general ex-
ceptions to a Member’s open-market commitments,302 which “are 
designed to allow Members to adopt measures, which may oth-
erwise violate a Member’s commitments, to protect public morals, 
public order, or other important societal interests.”303 The relevant 
exception to the free trade of data is Article XIV(c)(ii), which 
provides that GATS does not prevent a nation from limiting trade 
to protect privacy of personal data.304 Thus, a member may adopt 
a measure: 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which 
are not inconsistent with the provision of this Agreement includ-
ing those relating to: 
 
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation 
to the processing and dissemination of personal data 
and the protection of confidentiality of individual rec-
ords and accounts ....305 
Members invoking the GATS exception must prove that 
the measure is “necessary” to the relevant public policy goals.306 
Diane MacDonald and Christine Streatfeild analyze the 
WTO’s GATS and the “necessary” requirement in terms of the 
cross-border trade of data.307 MacDonald and Streatfeild insist 
that, when discussing the necessity requirement, the WTO’s Appel-
late Body has referred to a 
range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies 
“necessary” understood as “indispensable”; at the other end, is 
“necessary” taken to mean as “making a contribution to.” We con-
sider that a “necessary” measure is, in this continuum, located 
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significantly closer to the pole of “indispensable” than to the 
opposite pole of simply “making a contribution to.”308 
MacDonald and Streatfeild argue that the WTO needs to 
reanalyze the issues surrounding the digital trade.309 As technology 
advances, new infrastructures offer protection that may revoke 
the “necessary” status of many conservative data regulations or 
may not even be processing and disseminating “personal data.”310 
MacDonald and Streatfeild consider the data exchanged through 
financial institutions and wonder: 
[b]ut, is the processing of credit card transaction data regarded 
as “the processing and dissemination of personal data”? Is 
“personal data” equivalent to financial data or data that simp-
ly records a credit card transaction? What if the data has been 
disaggregated, such that it is stripped of markers that would 
allow the identification of a particular individual? How can 
disaggregated data still be regarded as “personal data” or “con-
fidential data”?311 
When considering the necessity requirement, many countries 
argue that digital trade should be restricted based on the recog-
nition of personal data privacy as a fundamental right.312 Thus, 
protecting the privacy of residence is of “paramount importance” 
to these countries.313 However, MacDonald and Streatfeild push 
back on this notion and leave one big question the WTO has yet 
to answer: “does this privacy mandate outweigh the importance 
many others, such as the United States, put on the free flow of 
information across the Internet?”314 
The WTO has left many questions unanswered regarding 
the growth of technology and the importance of the digital mar-
ket.315 MacDonald and Streatfeild admit that, in practice, the 
WTO dispute resolution panels usually uphold data restrictions 
based on the Article XIV privacy exception.316 Yet, MacDonald 
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and Streatfeild argue that, while “[a] tension exists between 
businesses that rely on that information for efficient ... advertis-
ing, and business processes and consumers who are increasingly 
demanding enhanced Internet privacy,” technological advance-
ments and the explosions of cross-border data transmissions “have 
placed the personal data issue on a collision course with interna-
tional trade disciplines.”317 
To promote the digital trade, the WTO must weigh privacy 
interests and new technologic protections.318 While states may 
be ready to seize the opportunity of digitization, arguments of 
sovereignty and privacy rights impose borders in the digital 
space.319 Trade agreements have helped overcome some of the 
problems and inconsistencies within international trade, and the 
WTO has provided a framework to bolster global conversations 
as technology advances.320 To encourage business productivity, 
efficiency and transparency in the digital market, the WTO needs 
to incorporate the free trade of data into its affirmative duties.321 
CONCLUSION 
The digital market needs a synthesis of new ideas com-
bined with the common international structures to create a poli-
cy initiative for new realms of human innovation.322 Data is now 
everywhere—in every sector, in every economy, in every organi-
zation and user of data—the public sector included.323 The oppor-
tunity big data offers business in terms of operational efficiency, 
overall firm performance, and customer service can potentially 
increase profit margins up to sixty percent.324 
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Legally, underdeveloped property rights and lack of regu-
lation of trade barriers has hindered “the fourth industrial revo-
lution.”325 Lack of property rights, combined with the digital 
divide the Technologic Giants exploit to eliminate any future com-
petitors, severely limits competition and the ability of new start-
ups to enter the market.326 Moreover, government restrictions on 
cross-border data flow negatively affect trade through increasing 
business costs for digital platforms, increasing the cost of digi-
tally intense services imports such as professional services and 
cloud computing, discouraging the globalization and connection 
of businesses, reducing productivity and exports, and limiting 
potential productivity gains across markets.327 
While the digital trade does offer vast business opportuni-
ties, one cannot ignore cybersecurity as an increasing threat.328 
As the world becomes more and more digital, society is exposed 
to cyberattacks on vital areas such as power grids and air traffic 
controls.329 Cyberattacks are evolving quickly, and the system of 
decentralized cybersecurity is struggling to catch up.330 The con-
stant threat has widened the gap in the digital debate between 
conservative security approaches like those taken in the EU and 
China, to softer approaches of compliance like regulations in the 
United States.331 
An international convention on cybersecurity coupled with 
WTO establishment of data as a commodity to which free trade 
principles apply may be the standardization the global realm 
needs. Standardization of cybersecurity would also present a uni-
fied front against cybercrime, offering quicker response actions, 
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better accountability standards, and overall more protection for 
citizens and business.332 However, policymakers should also recog-
nize that the advances in technology can offer safer data but can 
still bolster the digital market.333 Coordination between the WTO 
trading policies and a multilateral cybersecurity agreement will 
no doubt lead to complex and thorny discussions covering every-
thing from infrastructure designs to state sovereignty rights.334 
However, the law does not exist in a vacuum.335 Technology and 
public policy related to economics, liberty and the standard of 
living all implicate the development of relationships between 
nations.336 As technology advances, the law must as well.337 
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